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State Security v Freedom of
Expression: Legitimate Fight
against Terrorism or
Suppression of Political
Opposition?
Helen Keller* and Maya Sigron**
1. Introduction
On 31 March 2009, the UN Human Rights Committee (‘the Committee’)
adopted its views in the case of A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan.1 The Committee
held that the conviction of the two authors, who were Uzbek citizens, for seek-
ing, receiving and imparting information and radical ideas related to Islam
did not violate any of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR).2
The case is a telling example of the acute conflict between the fight against
terrorism and religious extremism3 on the one hand, and the protection of
human rights on the other. At the centre of the case is a radical Islamic organi-
sationçHizb ut-Tahrir. The organisation’s declared aim is to establish an
*Professor of Public Law, International Law and European Law, University of Zurich, and Member
of the Human Rights Committee (helen.keller@rwi.uzh.ch).
**PhD student, University of Zurich (maya.sigron@rwi.uzh.ch).
1 A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan (1233/2003), CCPR/C/95/D/1233/2003 (2009); 16 IHRR 719 (2009).
2 999 UNTS 171. See ibid. at para. 7.2.
3 As early as 1992, President Karimov started to fight religious extremism. The President saw
his authority challenged by political opposition emanating from independent politicised
Islam. After 11 September 2001, President Karimov perpetuated his fight under the cover of
the fight against terrorism and took advantage of the US fight against terrorism. Uzbekistan
quickly became a partner of the United States in this fight. For this reason, this case note
not only refers to the fight against religious extremism but also to the fight against terrorism.
See Pyati, Karimov’s War: Human Rights Defenders and Counterterrorism in Uzbekistan (New
York: Human Rights First, 2005) at 1^4, available at: http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/
05119-hrd-uzbek-rep-karimov.pdf [last accessed 3 November 2009].
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Islamic stateçthe Caliphateçand to restore the practice of Islamic piety.4
Conflicting with democratic and liberal ideas, Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology ser-
iously challenges the international commitment to freedom of expression and
freedom of religion.5 With regard to Uzbekistan, the challenge is intensified by
the fact that Uzbekistan’s President Karimov has utilised the situation to
repress any political opposition. It is believed that, since the beginning of his
campaign of religious persecution, several thousand persons have been
arrested in Uzbekistan for their membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir and other
underground activities.6 Arrested individuals often claim to have been sub-
jected to torture and ill treatment in order to extract confessions.7
Legal issues regarding Hizb ut-Tahrir transcend the Uzbek context. On 10
June 2006, a similar case against Russia, where Hizb ut-Tahrir is banned,8
was lodged with the European Court of Human Rights.9 As well, the German
Federal Administrative Court had to adjudicate on the prohibition of Hizb
ut-Tahrir in Germany in January 2006. The German Court upheld the ban on
the grounds that the organisation’s anti-Semitic statements were not compati-
ble with the understanding of nations (Vo« lkerversta« ndigung) and that the
approval of violence as a political means violated German law.10 Inconsistent
state responses to Hizb ut-Tahrir reveal the difficulties in assessing the
4 See, for example, Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Creating Enemies of the State: Religious
Persecution in Uzbekistan’ (USA: HRW, 2004) at 48, available at: http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2004/uzbekistan0304/index.htm [last accessed 3 November 2009].
5 International Crisis Group (ICG),‘Radical Islam in Central Asia: Responding to Hizb ut-Tahrir’,
ICG Asia Report No. 58 (Brussels: ICG, 2003) at 43, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?id¼1441&l¼1 [last accessed 3 November 2009].
6 See HRW, supra n. 4 at 3 et seq. In 2000, human rights activists estimated that between 6500
and 7000 persons had been arrested in Uzbekistan for membership in Hizb ut-Tahrir and
other underground activities. The Uzbek branch of Hizb ut-Tahrir believes that some 4000
of its members were arrested in 2000.
7 See Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights,
Including the Question of Torture and Detention: Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture, Theo
van Boven, Mission to Uzbekistan, 3 February 2003, E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2; and ICG,
‘Uzbekistan’s Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?’, Asia Report No. 46 (Brussels: ICG, 2003)
at 5 et seq, available at: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id¼1446&l¼1 [last
accessed 18 November 2009]. See also Muminov v Russia Application No. 42502/06,
Judgment of 11 December 2008 at para. 91 et seq.
8 On 14 February 2003, in a closed session, the Russian Supreme Court designated Hizb
ut-Tahrir to be a terrorist organisation and banned it. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation, ‘Daily News Bulletin: On the Detention of Members of the Terrorist
Organization ‘‘Islamic Liberation Party’’ (‘‘Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami’’)’, available at:
http://www.ln.mid.ru/bl.nsf/0/43bb94f12ad12c7543256d42005a9b49?OpenDocument [last
accessed 16 November 2009].
9 See Saybatalov v Russia Application No. 26377/06, lodged on 10 June 2006.
10 See German Federal Administrative Court, Judgment of the 6th Senate, 25 January 2006,
BVerwG 6 A 6.05 at 11. Underlying the judgment is an ordinance forbidding Hizb ut-Tahrir,
which the Federal Ministry of the Interior enacted on 15 January 2003. The Court noticed
that Hizb ut-Tahrir had so far not implemented its anti-Semitic statements. This failure did
not hinder the Court, however, which reasoned that the statements were of such overall
importance as to justify a ban.
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organisation’s character.Whereas several states have banned the organisation
(for example, Russia and Germany) or made it illegal by non-registration
(Uzbekistan), others have a more liberal approach (for example, United States,
Australia, Denmark, United Kingdom and Switzerland).11 In view of the deli-
cate political issues surrounding the organisation, the approach taken by the
Human Rights Committee in weighing the conflicting interests at stake is
worthy of examination.
2. Factual Background
On 16 February 1999, terrorist bombings took place in Tashkent, the capital of
Uzbekistan. The Uzbek government imputed the bombings to the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)12 and to the international Sunni pan-Islamist
political party named Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation). The bombings are
often cited by the Uzbek government as examples of the perilous nature of reli-
gious extremism.13 Following these bombings, some members and alleged
members of Hizb ut-Tahrir were arrested and tried in connection with these
events.14 All the documents found during searches of the detained persons’
homes and the homes of other citizens were submitted, at the request of the
Samarkand Regional Prosecutor’s Office, for expert examination.15 In March
1999, A.K. and A.R. were arrested after the authorities discovered numerous
written materials on religious themes in the attic of A.K.’s brother’s home.16
11 In the United States, Hizb ut-Tahrir is neither banned nor on the US list of terrorist organisa-
tions. See United States Department of State, ‘Foreign Terrorist Organizations’, 2009, available
at: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm [last accessed 7 January 2010]. Hizb
ut-Tahrir is not listed in Australia as a proscribed terrorist organisation: see Criminal Code
Regulations, S.R. 2002 No.67 as amended, made under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth.), pre-
pared on 9 July 2009. In Denmark, Hizb ut-Tahrir is not banned but there are calls for its
ban: see Hizb ut-Tahrir: The Liberation Party (Britain), ‘Denmark finds no Basis to Ban Hizb
ut-Tahrir’, 2008, available at: http://www.hizb.org.uk/hizb/press-centre/press-release/
denmark-finds-no-basis-to-ban-hizb-ut-tahrir.html [last accessed 3 November 2009]. In the
United Kingdom, where Hizb ut-Tahrir has its major domicile inWestern Europe, the organi-
sation is not yet banned. See BBC News, ‘Brown and Cameron Clash over ID’, 2007, available
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/6267656.stm [last accessed 3 November
2009]. Switzerland does not have its own lists of terrorist organisations. It uses the United
Nations’ list, which does not contain Hizb ut-Tahrir. See United Nations, ‘The Consolidated
List established and maintained by the 1267 Committee with respect to Al-Qaida, Usama bin
Laden, and the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated
with them’, 3 December 2009, available at: http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolida-
tedlist.htm [last accessed 7 January 2010].
12 The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is, unlike Hizb ut-Tahrir, sometimes deemed to be a ter-
rorist organisation. See, for example, the US list of terrorist organisations: ibid.
13 See Beckwith, ‘Uzbekistan: Islam, Communism, and Religious Liberty ^ An Appraisal of
Uzbekistan’s 1998 Law ‘‘On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations’’’, (2000) 3
BrighamYoung University Law Review 997 at 1008.
14 A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan, supra n. 1 at para. 2.1.
15 Ibid. at para. 2.2.
16 Ibid. at para. 2.3.
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On 6 May 1999, a group of experts consisting of specialists from Samarkand
State University expressed the view that the seized books, magazines and leaf-
lets sold by the accused and used for teaching their students called for
anti-constitutional activities to change the established order in Uzbekistan
and contained ideas running counter to Uzbek law. For example, they called
upon all Muslims to join together as one nationality or race in a single Islamic
state and to sacrifice their lives for this idea if necessary.17
On 6 August 1999, the Samarkand Regional Criminal Court convicted A.K.
and A.R. under Article 156(2)(e) of the Uzbek Criminal Code18 (Incitement of
Ethnic, Racial or Religious Hatred), as well as Article 159(4) (Attempts to
Overthrow Constitutional Order of Republic of Uzbekistan), Article 216
(Illegal Establishment of Public Associations or Religious Organisations),
Article 242(1) (Organisation of Criminal Community) and Article 244-1(3)(a)
and (c) (Production and Dissemination of Materials Containing Threat to
Public Security and Public Order). They were both sentenced to 16 years
imprisonment.19 In its reasoning, the Samarkand Regional Court noted that
A.K. and A.R. had engaged in a criminal conspiracy with Hizb ut-Tahrir. In
this connection, the Regional Court referred to the report of the group of
experts, which declared Hizb ut-Tahrir a religious and political association
aimed at waging political war in order to create a single Islamic state.20
Together with other members of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the two authors had directed
over 10 naqib21 and run more than 174 cells, which studied forbidden litera-
ture.22 A.K., who admitted having joined Hizb ut-Tahrir and taught a study
group, asserted that he had never conspired to organise explosions or resettle
populations and that he never intended to overthrow the constitutional order.
A.R. acknowledged that he had resolved to become a Hizb ut-Tahrir member,
and organised 6 study groups and taught 22 individuals.23
On 6 October 1999, the Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of
Uzbekistan upheld the authors’ appeal against the charges under Articles
156(2)(e), 242(1) and 244-1(3)(c) of the Criminal Code.24 The Supreme Court
17 Ibid. at para. 2.4.
18 A translated version of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 2012-XII, 22
September 1994, is available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b59216.html [last
accessed 3 November 2009].
19 A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan, supra n. 1 at para. 2.5.
20 Ibid. at para. 2.6.
21 According to Naumkin, a naqib is the head of a jihaz, which encompasses the limits of one
populated area. Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia, Between Pen and Rifle (Lanham, Md:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2005) at 144. Another author explains that a naqib is the leader of a
local committee at the city level, who is responsible for the administration of the group affairs
relevant in the area: see Karagiannis, ‘The Challenge of Radical Islam in Tajikistan: Hizb
ut-Tahrir al-Islami’, (2006) 34 Nationalities Paper 1 at 5.
22 A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan, supra n. 1 at para. 2.7.
23 Ibid. at para. 2.8.
24 Criminal Division of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Uzbekistan, Ruling No.
03-1016-99K, 6 October 1999.
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dismissed the appeal against their convictions under Article 159 of the
Criminal Code, but reclassified the offences from paragraph 4 thereof to
Article 159(3)(b). In its judgment, the Supreme Court did not rule on the con-
viction under Article 216 of the Criminal Code and left the sentence
unchanged.25
On 9 July 2003, after the Supreme Court’s judgment, A.K. and A.R. commu-
nicated their case to the Human Rights Committee. They claimed violations of
Articles 7, 9, 10, 14, 15 and 19 of the ICCPR. In their submission, they asserted
that they were prosecuted simply for reading and studying religious texts and
for meeting with like-minded persons.26 On 1 December 2004, A.K. was
granted an amnesty. He was released two and a half months later.27
3. The Human Rights Committee’s Views
The Committee declared the authors’ claims in respect of Articles 7, 9, 10, 14
and 15 of the ICCPR inadmissible on the basis that they had not been substan-
tiated. The claim under Article 19 of the ICCPR was declared admissible.28
Having carefully studied the experts’ report as well as the judgment of the
Samarkand Regional Criminal Court and the appellate ruling of the Uzbek
Supreme Court, the Committee held that there had not been a violation of
Article 19 of the ICCPR, which protects freedom of expression. The Committee
held that it ‘cannot conclude that the restrictions imposed on the authors’
expression were incompatible with article 19, paragraph 3’.29 The Committee
noted that the national courts had been concerned with ‘a perceived threat to
national security (violent overthrow of the constitutional order) and to the
rights of others’.30 The careful steps taken by the judiciary (for example, reli-
ance on the group of experts’ report) as well as the fact that, on appeal, the
authors did not challenge certain details of their conviction, further persuaded
the Committee that the limitations were justified.31
25 A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan, supra n. 1 at para. 2.9. The authors were finally convicted for
offences under Article 159 part 3(b), Articles 216 and 244-1 part 3(a) of the Uzbek Criminal
Code. Article 159 part 3(b) of the Criminal Code carries a range of punishment of five to ten
years imprisonment. The range of punishment of Article 216 of the Criminal Code is a fine
from 50 to 100 minimum monthly wages, or arrest up to six months, or imprisonment up to
five years. A violation of Article 244-1 part 3(a) is punishable with imprisonment from five
to eight years.
26 A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan, supra n. 1 at paras 3.1 and 3.2.
27 Ibid. at para. 2.10.
28 Ibid. at paras 6.3 and 6.4.
29 Ibid. at para. 7.2.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
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4. Analysis
A. Limiting Freedom of Expression
Article 19(2) of the ICCPR guarantees the right to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds. Actions going beyond the mere dissemina-
tion of information and ideas (for example, the active implementation of these
ideas) may be considered criminal acts not protected by Article 19(2) of the
ICCPR.32 Thus, states may criminalise the establishment of anti-state associa-
tions or actions aimed at overthrowing the constitutional order. However, not
every expression of critical opinions may be suppressed by invoking state secu-
rity concerns.33 Article 19(3) of the ICCPR provides that freedom of expression
carries with it special duties and responsibilities and for this reason certain
restrictions on the right are permitted.34 Such restrictions must be provided
by law and be necessary in order to achieve one or more of the objectives
enumerated in Article 19(3) of the ICCPR.35 They may directly prohibit an indi-
vidual from expressing a certain idea or opinion. Typically such restrictions
are indirect: they are aimed at the medium or legal entities selected to express
oneself, such as media enterprises, cinemas, religious groups and so on.36
The present case reveals two interferences with freedom of expression. First,
Hizb ut-Tahrir, as a result of having been denied registration according to
national law, was regarded as an illegal organisation. It was thus lawfully pre-
vented from pursuing its activities. Second, specific individual behaviour relat-
ing to the dissemination of certain information and ideas was criminalised.
The former constitutes an indirect restriction, the latter a direct restriction of
freedom of expression. However, the Committee only concerned itself with the
second interference, as there was a lack of information regarding whether the
non-registration of Hizb ut-Tahrir was compatible with the ICCPR.
B. Questionable Legal Basis for Uzbek Measures
The Uzbek limitations to freedom of expression are provided by law. The Law
of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Freedom of Worship and Religious
32 Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, 2nd edn (Kehl: Engel,
2005) at 445.
33 Ibid.
34 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 10: Freedom of opinion (Article 19), 29 June
1983, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) 181; 1-2 IHRR 9 (1994) at para. 4.
35 Article 19(3) ICCPR provides: ‘The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this
article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for
respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of national security or of
public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.’
36 See Nowak, supra n. 32 at 449.
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Organizations (‘1998 Freedom of Conscience Law’)37 is the primary legal basis
for these limitations. The Uzbek Criminal Code, which was amended subse-
quent to the enactment of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law, served as the
legal basis for the punishment of the authors’ acts. These two statutes contain
provisions that can further affect the right to peaceful assembly (Article 21 of
the ICCPR) and freedom of association (Article 22 of the ICCPR).38 According
to these national provisions, Hizb ut-Tahrir is illegal in Uzbekistan for not
having been registered.39
While the Committee requires that national laws comply with the ICCPR,40
it does not examine in the individual complaint procedure the compatibility of
laws with the ICCPR in abstracto.41 In this connection, the Committee con-
siders it sufficient if the concrete application of the law to an individual is con-
sistent with the ICCPR.42 This approach may produce divergences between
the results of the state reporting procedure under Article 40 of the ICCPR and
the individual complaint procedure under the first Optional Protocol. In its
last two concluding observations on Uzbekistan, the Committee criticised the
1998 Freedom of Conscience Law and the use of criminal law as not being
fully compatible with the ICCPR.43 However, despite considering it necessary
in its views on a different communication to underline the problematic nature
of a national statute,44 the Committee abstained from doing the same in the
present communication. It settled for succinct views in order to avoid tackling
a delicate issue. As a result, the examination of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR
37 For a translated version of the Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan on Freedom of Worship and
Religious Organizations as published in the Uzbek Press, see Corley, ‘Narodnoye Slovo’,
(Tashkent: BBC, 15 May 1998), available at: http://www2.stetson.edu/psteeves/relnews/
uzbeklaw.html [last accessed 3 November 2009].
38 For more detailed information about particular Articles of the 1998 Freedom of Conscience
Law, which can be interpreted as violating Articles 21 and 22 ICCPR, see Beckwith, supra n.
13 at 1029.
39 See HRW, supra n. 4 at 50.
40 See, for example, Robert Faurisson v France (550/1993), CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993 (1996); 4 IHRR
444 (1997) at para. 9.5.
41 See, for example, Leo Hertzberg et al. v Finland (61/1979), CCPR/C/OP/1 at 124 (1985) at paras
9.2 and 9.3; and Robert Faurisson v France, ibid. at para. 9.3.
42 See, for example, Robert Faurisson v France, ibid. at para. 9.5 (‘For these reasons the Committee
is satisfied that the Gayssot Act, as read, interpreted and applied to the author’s case by the
French courts, is in compliance with the provisions of the Covenant.’).
43 See Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee regarding Uzbekistan, 26 April
2005, CCPR/CO/83/UZB at para. 22; and Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee regarding Uzbekistan, 26 April 2001, CCPR/CO/71/UZB at para. 24.
44 See Robert Faurisson v France, supra n. 40 at para. 9.3 (‘Although it does not contest that the
application of the terms of the Gayssot Act, which, in their effect, make it a criminal offence
to challenge the conclusions and the verdict of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg, may lead, under different conditions than the facts of the instant case, to deci-
sions or measures incompatible with the Covenant, the Committee is not called upon to criti-
cize in the abstract laws enacted by States parties.’).
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in the present case fell short of earlier, more in-depth reviews of the
provision.45
As the Committee was not called upon to criticise the pertinent Uzbek law
in the abstract, the crucial point is whether the concrete application of the
law leading to the convictions of the authors was necessary in order to protect
national security and the rights of others.46 The existence of a threat is thus a
precondition to the application of the necessity test. Whether the actions
taken by the Uzbek government were necessary depends on the character of
the threat and, in the present case, the threat derived from the dissemination
of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology.
C. The Ideology of Hizb ut-Tahrir as a Real Threat
Taqi al-Din Nabhani, the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir, formed the organisation’s
global ideology in the 1950s.47 Today, Hizb ut-Tahrir declares that its ‘objective
is to resume the Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic State that exe-
cutes the systems of Islam and carries its call to the world’.48 The projected
Islamic stateçthe Caliphateçis to be under the exclusive reign of Islamic
law (Sharia) and any other form of legal provision or political structureçsuch
as democracyçis uncompromisingly rejected.49 In addition, strong anti-
American and anti-Semitic tendencies reveal themselves in Hizb ut-Tahrir’s lit-
erature.50 Some aspects of the organisation’s aims are in opposition to different
rights provided by the ICCPR. Invoking the ICCPR under such circumstances
might be considered as an abuse of the right of submission,51 and as such
would render the communication inadmissible according to Article 3 of the
45 Views that thoroughly examine the fulfilment of the conditions are, for example,
Ballantyne, Davidson, McIntyre v Canada (359/1989), CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 385/1989/
Rev.1 (1993); 1 IHRR 145 (1994) at para. 11.4; Robert Faurisson v France, supra n. 40 at para.
9.4 et seq.; Keun-Tae Kim (represented by Mr Yong Whan Cho, Duksu Law Offices, in Seoul) v
Republic of Korea (574/1994), CCPR/C/64/D/574/1994 (1999); 6 IHRR 930 (1999) at paras 12.2
et seq.
46 See Articles 19(3), 21 and 22(2) ICCPR.
47 See, for example, Naumkin, supra n. 21 at 128.
48 See official website of Hizb ut-Tahrir, ‘About us’, available at: http://english.hizbuttahrir.org/
1-19-about-us.aspx [last accessed 3 November 2009].
49 See, for example, ICG, supra n.5 at 4. Hizb ut-Tahrir rejects the political method of gradualism
to implement the Sharia. See Karagiannis, ‘Political Islam in Uzbekistan: Hizb ut-Tahrir
al-Islami’, (2006) 58 Europe-Asia Studies 261 at 266.
50 See HRW, supra n. 4 at 56 et seq. In the present communication, anti-Semitism was not an
issue. If it was, the Committee would have had to consider Article 20(2) of the ICCPR, which
demands the prohibition of religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence.
51 For detailed information concerning the abuse of the right of submission, see Mo« ller and de
Zayas, United Nations Human Rights Committee, Case Law 1977^2008, A Handbook (Kehl:
Engel, 2009) at 92 et seq.
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first Optional Protocol.52 An application of Article 5(1) of the ICCPR in connec-
tion with Article 3 of the first Optional Protocol could further have endangered
the admissibility of A.K. and A.R.’s communication. As far as individuals are
concerned, Article 5(1) of the ICCPR is intended to prevent reliance upon
rights recognised in the ICCPR, such as freedom of expression or association,
to protect ‘any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms
recognized’ in the ICCPR. Jurisprudence on this provision is very scarce53 and
no General Comment exists in this regard.54 The impact of Article 5(1) of the
ICCPR is therefore difficult to evaluate.
According to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the establishment of the Caliphate is to come
about in three stages of political struggle. In the beginning, Hizb ut-Tahrir
members try to convince other individuals of their ideas with the objective of
recruiting them as new members. This involves studying Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideol-
ogy and educating new members (stage 1çperiod of study and culture).
Subsequently, Hizb ut-Tahrir will interact with the wider Muslim community,
the Ummah, in order to establish Islam in life, state and society (stage 2ç
period of interaction with the Ummah). Finally, Islamic governance is estab-
lished and Islam and Sharia implemented (stage 3çperiod of establishing
Islamic governance and implementing Sharia).55 Hizb ut-Tahrir renounces vio-
lence in order to establish the Caliphate. However, their vague ideological com-
mitment to non-violence does not prohibit the use of violence in defensive
wars or conflicts that are already in progress.56 Some of the group’s members
believe that, eventually, war will be unavoidable in order to establish the
Caliphate since it is the only way to overcome the prevailing repression.57
As a matter of fact, it has never been proven that Hizb ut-Tahrir has performed
any violent or terrorist act in Central Asia.58
In its fight against religious extremists, the Uzbek government has empha-
sised the dangerous character of Hizb ut-Tahrir and has arrested its members
en masse for various crimes.59 In respect of the dissemination of the ideology
52 In J.R.T. and the W.G. Party v Canada (104/1981), Admissibility Decision, CCPR/C/OP/2 at 25
(1984) at para. 8(b), the author claimed a violation of Article 19 of the ICCPR by Canada,
which prevented him from disseminating anti-Semitic messages. The Committee found that
Canada had an obligation under Article 20(2) of the ICCPR to prevent such advocacy of
racial and religious hatred. In respect of this claim, the communication was declared inad-
missible according to Article 3 of the First Optional Protocol.
53 In M.A. v Italy (117/1981), Admissibility Decision, CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 at para. 13.3, the
Committee referred inter alia to Article 5(1) ICCPR and declared the communication concern-
ing Article 19 ICCPR inadmissible.
54 See Mo« ller and de Zayas, supra n. 51 at 143.
55 See ICG, supra n. 5 at 5; and Walker, ‘Islam, Islamism and Political Order in Central Asia’,
(2003) 56 Journal of International Affairs 21 at 38.
56 See HRW, supra n. 4 at 48.
57 See Ro’i,‘Islam, State and Society in Central Asia’, (2003) 14 Helsinki Monitor 242 at 251et seq.
58 See, for example, ICG, supra n. 5 at 24.
59 See Rhodes and Tscherne-Lempia« inen, ‘Human Rights and Terrorism in the Central Asian
OSCE States’, (2002) 13 Helsinki Monitor 36 at 48; HRW, supra n. 4 at 117 et seq.; and ICG,
supra n. 5 at 33.
State Security v Freedom of Expression 159
of Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Human Rights Committee agreed with the Uzbek govern-
ment that a threat to national security, consisting in the violent overthrow of
the constitutional order, existed.60 Since Hizb ut-Tahrir is not said to have
used force in order to achieve their aim, it is questionable whether this threat
is severe enough to warrant the measures taken. The so far non-violent
nature of the threat emanating from Hizb ut-Tahrir finds endorsement in
reports by Human RightsWatch and the International Crisis Group.61 It would
have been up to the authors of the communication to submit these reports for
substantiation, all the more so since the Committee lacks competence to
receive third party interventions or amicus curiae briefs.62 Extending the
Committee’s power to consider admitting amicus curiae briefs could potentially
introduce the Committee to useful information for evaluating a case.
Judgments delivered by the European Court of Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, both of which accept third party
interventions,63 substantiate this assumption.
Even if the non-violent means used by Hizb ut-Tahrir may be legal, the pro-
posed change is certainly not compatible with democracy and the prevalent
constitutional order in Uzbekistan. Due to its history, its geopolitical situation,
the high percentage of Muslims64 and the poverty in some segments of the
population, the risk of destabilisation by radical Islamic ideas may be higher
in Uzbekistan than, for instance, in a Western country.65 Since the fall of the
Soviet Union, secular Uzbekistan claimed to fear destabilisation by Islamic
extremistsçimprecisely referred to asWahhabis.66 Along with Hizb ut-Tahrir’s
remarkable rise in popularity,67 it is feared that it may align with local extrem-
ist groups, such as the IMU, who advocate the use of force as a means.68
60 A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan, supra n. 1 at para. 7.2.
61 See HRW, supra n. 4 at 51 et seq.; and ICG, supra n. 5 at 24.
62 See Nowak, supra n. 32 at 873.
63 See Rule 44 European Court of Human Rights, Rules of the Court, July 2009; and Article 41
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Rules of Procedure, approved by the Court during
its XLIX Ordinary Period of Sessions, November 2000, and partially amended by the Court
during its LXXXII Ordinary Period of Sessions, held from January 2009.
64 About 88 percent of the Uzbek population is Muslim: see Permanent Mission of the Republic
of Uzbekistan to the United Nations, ‘Culture, Religion, Profile of Uzbekistan’, available at:
http://www.un.int/wcm/content/site/uzbekistan/cache/offonce/pid/
8491;jsessionid¼78C81AFBA7358CC44C5867E3AA648768 [last accessed 3 November 2009].
65 See Karagiannis, supra n. 49 at 267 et seq.; and Chaudet, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir: An Islamist Threat
to Central Asia?’, (2006) 26 Journal of Muslim MinorityAffairs 113 at 118 et seq.
66 The word ‘Wahhabi’ is derived from a Muslim scholar, Muhammad bin Abd al-Wahhab (1703^
1791), who proclaimed the simplicity of the Islamic religion deriving from the Koran and the
Sunna.Wahhabism is a branch of Sunni Islam, which is assigned to the Hanbali School.
Today the conservative movement finds most followers in Saudi Arabia and Qatar. For further
information, see DeLong-Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad
(London: Tauris, 2004).
67 Cornell and Spector, ‘Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists’, (2002) 25 TheWashington
Quarterly 193 at 200, pointed out that Hizb ut-Tahrir’s popularity is growing. Karagiannis,
supra n. 49, enumerates several reasons for Hizb ut-Tahrir’s popularity in Uzbekistan.
68 See ICG, supra n. 5 at 29.
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It is possible that, in the future, Hizb ut-Tahrir may turn to violence.69 Much
depends though on the environment in which Hizb ut-Tahrir is situated and
which is created inter alia by the responses given to the organisation by
states.70 For the moment, several observers consider the threat currently
posed by Hizb ut-Tahrir and other Islamist groups as small or at least exagger-
ated.71 States are thus well advised to not needlessly fuel this threat with their
politics.
D. Second Thoughts on Necessity
In terms of risk assessment, the Committee concluded that the facts of the case
indeed amounted to a threat posed by Hizb ut-Tahrir to national security and
the rights of others. The determination whether a situation warrants invoking
national security as a ground for human rights limitations lies with the
Committee alone; states do not enjoy a margin of discretion.72 In line with its
case law, the Committee examined whether the restrictions met its strict tests
of justification, which require that the state specifies the exact nature of the
threat and how the limitation manages to contain this threat.73 The
Committee considered that the measures taken by Uzbekistan were necessary
and thus did not amount to a violation of the right to freedom of expression.
Although the finding in A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan may be sound, as any
risk assessment involves an evaluative judgment drawing on a certain set of
data, there remains room for alternative conclusions. A.K. and A.R. were con-
victed for the simple dissemination of Hizb ut-Tahrir materials and not for
actively implementing its ideas. Neither the threat emanating from the ideol-
ogy of Hizb ut-Tahrir in general74 nor that following from the actions of A.K.
and A.R. in particular are as grave as proclaimed. Under these circumstances,
the measures taken seem not to be proportionate to the aim pursued. This is
not to dispute that some limitations upon an individual’s freedom of expression
may be necessary in order to protect national security and the rights of
others. The point at issue is whether the specific state measures taken in
69 Karagiannis and McCauley,‘Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami: Evaluating theThreat Posed by a Radical
Islamic Group that Remains Nonviolent’, (2006) 18 Terrorism and Political Violence 315 at 328
et seq.
70 See ICG, supra n. 5 at 43.
71 Ibid. at 29;Walker, supra n. 55 at 21; and Chaudet, supra n. 65 at 119 and 123.
72 See Conte and Burchill, Defining Civil and Political Rights, 2nd edn (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009)
at 44; Keun-Tae Kim (represented by Mr. YongWhan Cho, Duksu Law Offices, in Seoul) v Republic
of Korea, supra n. 45 at paras 10.3 and 12.4 et seq.
73 See, for example, Vladimir Viktorovich Shchetko v Belarus (1009/2001), CCPR/C/87/D/1009/
2001(2006); 14 IHRR 11 (2007) at paras 7.3 and 7.5; Keun-Tae Kim (represented by Mr. Yong
Whan Cho, Duksu Law Offices, in Seoul) v Republic of Korea, supra n. 45 at para. 12.4; and
Conte and Burchill, supra n. 72 at 87.
74 See Chaudet, supra n. 65 at 119 et seq.
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the particular case meet the proportionality test implied by the necessity
requirement.75
It follows that the Committee could have interpreted the necessity require-
ment more narrowly and concluded that there was a violation of Article 19(3)
of the ICCPR. The finding of a violation might have contributed to a perceptible
change of anti-terror politics. The war on terror, which has served President
Karimov as a cloak for his repressive politics and made these politics find
favour withWestern states,76 is at the crossroads. Policy-makers have come to
realise that sacrificing human rights for short-term security benefits is not
beneficial in the long run.77 Against this backdrop, the Committee’s decision
has to be understood as a manifestation of judicial restraint rather than as a
permissive stance towards anti-terrorism or anti-extremism measures. A carte
blanche, as it were, does not exist, as limitations to freedom of expression
are subject to strict scrutiny. The reasoning of the Committee provides little
guidance for possible restrictions. In particular, an in-depth analysis of the
nature of the invoked threat is missing. It would also have been helpful if the
Committee had spelt out a test, such as for instance the ‘clear and present
danger test’,78 by which to determine the existence of a threat justifying the
restrictions.
5. Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion and Belief
A. Iura novit curia before the Human Rights Committee?
The fact that the Committee did not examine whether there was a violation of
freedom of religion raises several issues. In this regard, one has to bear in
mind that the authors did not explicitly invoke Article 18 of the ICCPR which
75 See Nowak, supra n. 32 at 460; Robert Faurisson v France, supra n. 40 at individual opinion by
Elizabeth Evatt and David Kretzmer, co-signed by Eckart Klein (concurring) at para. 8; and
Rafael Marques de Morais vAngola (1128/2002), CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002 (2005); 12 IHRR 644
(2005) at para. 6.8. In the case of Kim Jong-Cheol v Republic of Korea concerning Article 19
ICCPR, the Committee noted ‘that the sanction visited on the author, albeit one or [sic] crim-
inal law, cannot be categorized as excessively harsh’. Kim Jong-Cheol v Republic of Korea (968/
2001), Admissibility Decision, CCPR/C/84/D/968/2001(2005); 13 IHRR 67 (2006) at para. 8.3.
76 See Hanks, ‘Religion and Law in Uzbekistan’, in Richardson (ed.), Regulating Religion, Case
Studies from Around the Globe (NewYork: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2004) at 326.
77 For the US approach, see for example Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism, ‘A New Approach to Safeguarding Americans’, (Washington:
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2009), available at: http://www.whitehouse
.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-John-Brennan-at-the-Center-for-Strategic-and-International-
Studies/ [last accessed 3 November 2009]. For more detailed information, see International
Commission of Jurists, Assessing Damage, Urging Action: Report of the Eminent Jurist Panel on
Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists,
2009), available at: http://icj.org/IMG/EJP-report.pdf [last accessed 3 November 2009].
78 Justice Holmes introduced the test in Schenk v United States 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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provides: ‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion.’As Hizb ut-Tahrir perceives itself as a political party,79 this might be
the reason for the authors’ only rather vague reference to freedom of religion.
In their communication to the Committee, the authors only submitted that
‘the convictions amount to breaches of Articles 29 and 31 of the Uzbek
Constitution, which guarantee freedom of thought and religion’.80 Neither the
first Optional Protocol81 nor the Committee’s Rules of Procedure82 require an
author to name a particular provision in their communication. However, the
author must contend that the outlined facts constitute a violation of a right in
the ICCPR.83 According to Article 1 of the first Optional Protocol, the author
simply needs to claim a violation of any of the rights protected by the ICCPR.
The Committee has clarified in several views that it will examine on its own
initiative (iura novit curia) which provisions of the ICCPR may have been
violated by the facts presented.84 In recent years, the Committee has estab-
lished the practice of limiting its examination of an individual communication
to the human rights issues expressly raised therein if the author is
represented by counsel. By contrast, in cases where there is a legally unrepre-
sented author, the Committee will claim full power of examination.85
Although this differentiation may seem appropriate at first glance, it may
prove unsatisfactory. Complainants in the human rights field are sometimes
79 See the organisation’s own word: ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir is a political party whose ideology is Islam,
so politics is its work and Islam is its ideology.’ Hizb ut-Tahrir, ‘Definition’, available at: http://
www.hizb-ut-tahrir.org/index.php/EN/def [last accessed 3 November 2009].
80 A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan, supra n. 1 at para. 3.2.
81 Uzbekistan acceded to the First Optional Protocol on 28 September 1995.
82 Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, 22 September 2005, CCPR/C/3/Rev.8.
83 Rule 96(b) Rules of Procedure. In connection with Treaty Body complaint procedures, the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights holds that ‘[i]t is helpful,
though not strictly necessary, for you [the author] to identify the articles of the treaty that
have allegedly been violated.’ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights, ‘Human Rights Treaty Bodies ^ Individual Communications: 23 FAQ about Treaty
Body complaints procedures: ‘‘What information do you need to provide in your complaint?’’’,
available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/individual.htm#what [last
accessed 3 November 2009].
84 See B.d.B. et al. v The Netherlands (273/1989), Admissibility Decision, Supp. No. 40 (A/44/40) at
286 (1989) at para. 6.3 (‘The Committee observes that whereas authors must invoke the sub-
stantive rights contained in the Covenant, they are not required, for purposes of the
Optional Protocol, necessarily to do so by reference to specific articles of the Covenant.’);
Marieta Tera¤ n Jijo¤ n v Ecuador (277/1988), CCPR/C/44/D/277/1988 (1992) at para. 6; Mohammed
Ajaz and Amir Jamil v Republic of Korea (644/1995), CCPR/C/66/D/644/1995 (1999); 7 IHRR 34
(2000) at para. 3.3; and Zouhair Ben Said v Norway (767/1997), CCPR/C/68/D/767/1997 (2000);
8 IHRR 17 (2001) at para. 6.4.
85 In Sattorov v Tajikistan the Committee decided that the facts raised issues under Articles 6, 7,
10, 14(1) and 14(3)(g) ICCPR, even though the author, not represented by counsel, did not
invoke Article 10 ICCPR; see Sattorov v Tajikistan (1200/2003), CCPR/C/95/D/1200/2003
(2009) at paras 3.1^3.4 and 7.4.
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represented by inexperienced lawyers, often on a pro bono basis.86 Therefore,
the Committee has not always followed this practice strictly.87
In the instant case, the authors were represented by counsel. They claimed
that they were convicted ‘because of their religious views and activities’ and
that their convictions amounted to breaches of both freedom of thought and
religion as guaranteed by the Uzbek Constitution.88 The Committee, however,
did not examine whether these claims raised issues in connection with
Article 18 of the ICCPR. This approach can be explained by the fact that the
authors did not exhaust local remedies with regard to freedom of religion.
Article 5(2)(b) of the first Optional Protocol requires domestic remedies to be
exhausted prior to the submission of a communication to the Committee. This
requirement allowed the Committee to steer around the delicate question as
to what extent radical Islamic thoughts are protected by freedom of religion.
The question continues to remain a blank spot on the international human
rights map. One can expect, however, that this controversial issue will be
raised again. It is only a matter of time. At the regional level, the European
Court of Human Rights is already concerned with a case touching on this
subject.89
B. Impact on Freedom of Religion
In recent years, the inter-relationship between freedom of expression and free-
dom of religion has been marked by heated debates on blasphemy, which were
sparked by the Danish cartoon controversy (Mohammed cartoons).90 This con-
troversy raised questions of the permissibility of statements infringing upon
religious beliefs of others under the protection of freedom of expression. Yet,
neither blasphemy nor the critique that some interpretations of the Koran do
not respect freedom of religion (for example, the punishment of apostasy)
were at stake in the present case. Instead, taking centre stage were political
ideas which have their roots in Islam; ideas that may be concurrently pro-
tected by both freedom of expression and freedom of religion.91 Intolerance
86 See Mo« ller and de Zayas, supra n. 51 at 44.
87 In Geniuval M. Cagas, Wilson Butin and Julio Astillero v The Philippines (788/1997), CCPR/
C/73/D/788/1997 (2002); 9 IHRR 319 (2002) at para. 3.4, the Committee declared, for example,
that the facts submitted raise issues under several not expressly invoked Articles. The authors
were represented by counsel.
88 A. K. and A. R. v Uzbekistan, supra n. 1 at para. 3.2.
89 See Saybatalov v Russia, supra n. 9.
90 See Keane, ‘Cartoon Violence and Freedom of Expression’, (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly
845; and Harkness et al., ‘Crossing the Line? Freedom of Speech and Religious Sensibilities’,
(2007) 40 Political Science and Politics 275.
91 Some researchers believe that Taqi al-Din Nabhani, the founder of Hizb ut-Tahrir, was an
adherent of the Hanbali School, which forms a part of Sunni Islam. Nevertheless, due to the
vagueness of its theological and legal platform, Hizb ut-Tahrir gains support among Muslims
believing in different forms of Islam. See Naumkin, supra n. 21 at 135.
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towards Islam, especially in times of a global war against terrorism and
extremism, is a further topic the case touches upon. International human
rights standards provide an enforceable minimum standard of tolerance.
Doubts about the reasonableness of construing the right to religious free-
dom to cover acts such as those by Hizb ut-Tahrir members are well founded.
Hizb ut-Tahrir understands itself as a global Islamic political organisation
(Liberation Party).92 Yet, Hizb ut-Tahrir members are eligible for the protection
of freedom of religion (Article 18 of the ICCPR) as long as they manifest their
belief in Islam and as long as this manifestation is compatible with Article
5(1) of the ICCPR.93
The dissemination of leaflets containing religious ideas and aimed at the
improvement of society is one possible manifestation of one’s religion or belief
in public. Studying religious texts and teaching them also falls under the pro-
tection of freedom of religion.94 The authors claimed to have studied inter alia
the Koran, which is undoubtedly a religious book.95 The nature of other texts
is more problematic. Expressing Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology, these texts aim at
establishing the Caliphate and improving society. Thus, the struggle to improve
society, i.e. Jihad, is a Muslim’s duty. The authors possibly regarded the dissemi-
nation of these texts as their religious duty, which makes their acts eligible for
protection under Article 18 of the ICCPR. However, even if disseminating
these texts falls under Article 18 of the ICCPR, this does not imply that acts
concerned are protected under Article 18(3) of the ICCPR. Manifestations of
religion or belief may be limited under the conditions enumerated in Article
18(3) of the ICCPR, which generally correspond to the conditions set out in
Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. However, the two limitation clauses do have their
differences. Article 18(3) of the ICCPR permits limitations only towards mani-
festations of one’s religion or belief in order to protect public safety but not
national security. With regard to the rights of others, interferences are only
allowed as far as fundamental rights and freedoms of others are at stake. The
significance of freedom of religion and especially its non-derogable character
may explain these differences.96
92 See Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, ‘Media Information Pack’, at 2, available at: http://www.hizb.org
.uk/hizb/images/PDFs/HT_media_pack.pdf [last accessed 3 November 2009]; and HRW, supra
n. 4 at 49. In this context, one has to bear in mind that Islam is a religion with a political
nature: see Polonskaya and Malashenko, Islam in Central Asia (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1994)
at 120.
93 The term ‘religion and belief’ in Article 18 ICCPR is to be understood broadly. It certainly
encompasses the Islamic ideas of Hizb ut-Tahrir. For the scope of the term ‘religion and
belief’, see Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22: The right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion (Article 18), 30 July 1993, CCPR/C/21/REV.1/ADD.4; 1-2
IHRR 30 (1994), at para. 2.
94 Ibid. at para. 4.
95 A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan, supra n. 1 at para. 2.3.
96 Partsch, ‘Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms’, in Henkin (ed.), The
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1981) 209 at 212.
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C. Politicisation of Islam and Criminalisation of Religion
After the fall of the Soviet Union, Sunni Islam served as a means for identity
and nation-building in a formally secular Uzbekistan. The Soviet distinction
between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ Islam, where ‘official’ Islam denotes the teach-
ings of Islam flowing from the Muslim leaders appointed by the government,
is still present in today’s Uzbekistan.97 President Karimov sponsors religious
education in instances that do not challenge his politics.98 At the same time,
he labels any critical Islamic ideas as being extremist or fundamentalist.99
The 1998 Freedom of Conscience Law expresses this politicisation of Islam.
The law restricts freedom to manifest one’s religion, it limits freedom to dissem-
inate religious ideas and it restricts freedom to assemble for religious purposes
as guaranteed in Article 21 of the ICCPR.100 However, the most alarming char-
acteristic is that it makes religious activity itself a matter of national security.
By equating religious offences with national security offences, the law crimina-
lises religious activity itself.101 To prevent violence, the law criminalises religion
instead of the violence itself.102 It is thus questionable whether the limitations,
which caused this criminalisation in the authors’ case, are compatible with
the authors’ right to manifest their religion.
D. Limiting Freedom of Religion
Assuming that the dissemination of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology is covered by
Article 18 of the ICCPR, the question as to the admissibility of the restrictions
imposed by the Uzbek government arises. Public safety or fundamental rights
and freedoms of others must be at stake if freedom of religion is to be limited
lawfully. It is beyond dispute that the dissemination of the ideology of Hizb
ut-Tahrir threatens fundamental rights and freedoms of others.With regard to
‘public safety’, the situation is not that clear. General Comment 22 regarding
Article 18 makes clear that ‘paragraph 3 of article 18 is to be strictly inter-
preted: restrictions are not allowed on grounds not specified there, even if
they would be allowed as restrictions to other rights protected in the
Covenant, such as national security’.103 The term ‘public safety’ is not tanta-
mount to ‘national security’.104 As it requires a specific danger threatening
97 See Beckwith, supra n. 13 at 1003.
98 Ibid. at 1025.
99 See Ro’i, supra n. 57 at 249.
100 See Beckwith, supra n. 13 at 1012.
101 Ibid. at 1019.
102 Ibid. at 1034.
103 General Comment No. 22, supra n. 93 at para. 8.
104 The protection of ‘public safety’ aims at the protection against danger to the life or physical
integrity of persons or serious damage to their property. See Conte and Burchill, supra n. 72
at 57; The Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the
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the security of persons or things, the scope of public safety is different from
that of national security.105 On the face of it, it may be said that the dissemina-
tion of Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology does not specifically endanger public safety.
However, only an in-depth examination of the issue can provide the solution.
The considerations discussed above simply call attention to the fact that the
consistency of the measures taken by the Uzbek government with regard to
freedom of religion is not as easily established as is compatibility with freedom
of expression. Summing up, the application of Article 18 of the ICCPR to partic-
ular aspects of Islam raises several issues, which require further in-depth
analysis.
6. Conclusion
In A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan, the Committee did not find a violation of the
guarantee of freedom of expression in Article 19 of the ICCPR with regard to
the conviction of the authors for disseminating Hizb ut-Tahrir’s ideology. The
key question this finding raises is the necessity of limitations within the mean-
ing of Article 19(3) of the ICCPR. The Committee did not simply substitute the
state’s discretion for its own but examined whether the respondent state’s
restrictions met the Committee’s strict test of justification. Although the
Committee did not contest the legality of the measures taken by the Uzbek gov-
ernment, the rather vague threat that the applicants presented could have
allowed the Committee to find a violation without groundlessly substituting
its discretion for that of the state.
The Committee’s views are concise, and the succinct text might be easily
misunderstood. Even though the Committee declared the measures taken
by the Uzbek government as compatible with the ICCPR, it did not issue a
carte blanche for anti-terrorism or anti-extremism measures. Rather, the
Committee’s views point out that the ICCPR contains rules fully applicable in
the fight against terrorism. Moreover, it reveals that measures taken during
this fight are not exempt from scrutiny on their compatibility with the ICCPR.
The case also illustrates the Committee’s limited capacity as the supervisory
organ responsible for reviewing compliance with the ICCPR. Its restricted com-
petence as regards individual communications prevented the Committee from
addressing certain questions that the facts strongly suggested in the case at
hand. Neither Hizb ut-Tahrir as such, President Karimov’s repressive politics
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Siracusa Principles), E/CN.4/1985/4
Annex (1985) at para. 33. The objective of ‘national security’ is to protect alternatively the
democratic order of the State, the existence of the nation, its territorial integrity or its politi-
cal independence against force or threat of force: see Conte and Burchill, supra n. 72 at 55;
and Siracusa Principles at para. 29.
105 See Nowak, supra n. 32 at 427.
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to political opposition, nor the measures taken by the Uzbek government in its
fight against religious extremism were considered. Against the backdrop of
the ongoing debate about radical Islam, this failure weighs heavily.While pro-
cedural issues prevented the Committee from examining a violation of freedom
of religion, judicial restraint precluded it from commenting on other points.
The Committee obviously did not want to jump ahead in an area where little
praxis exists at the international level. In A.K. and A.R. v Uzbekistan, judicial
restraint prevailed over the call for further guidance in reconciling state secu-
rity concerns with the rights of radical Muslims. The time might not have
been ripe for a bolder decision. However, considering the existing radical
Islamic trend and bearing in mind the abuses of the fight against terrorism, a
clear stance in human rights is wanted more than ever.
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